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THE PSYCHIATRIST AS AN EXPERT WITNESS: 
SOME RUMINATIONS AND SPECULATIONSt 
Bernard L. Diamond* and David W. Louisell** 
C ON SIDER the difference between the expert testimony of an ortho-pedic surgeon in a personal injury suit and the testimony of 
a psychiatrist in a murder trial in which some elements of the mens 
rea are at issue. In both instances an expert opinion is received in 
evidence, providing the trier of fact with technical, specialized in-
formation which must, or should, be available in order to permit 
a rational decision-making process. Well-established rules govern the 
nature of expert evidence and its mode of presentation.1 In legal 
theory, the orthopedic surgeon and the psychiatrist are both experts 
-physicians-who perform comparable functions in the court pro-
ceedings. Presumably, they are governed by the same rules of evi-
dence, they are subject to the same restrictions, and their testimony 
bears an essential, though perhaps fragmentary, relationship to the 
chief issues at trial. · 
In actual practice, however, there can be a vast difference be-
~veen the functions which these two experts play in the legal 
process. 
In a typical, relatively uncomplicated accident suit involving an 
injury to the body, the questions to be decided are capable of reason-
ably precise definition and resolution: What was the negligent act 
or omission by the defendant? What was the causal relationship be-
tween that act or omission of the defendant and the injury and dis-
ability of the plaintiff? Was the plaintiff free of contributory negli-
gence? What is the nature of the injury? What is the extent and 
permanency of the consequent disability? Obviously, even in simple 
litigation there are also less well-defined questions that are incapable 
of easy resolution. How much pain and suffering has the plaintiff 
undergone in the past and how much may he anticipate in the 
future? What is the monetary value of an hour, a day, or a month 
t Support, in part, for this study was provided by a grant to Dr. Diamond from the 
Institute of Social Sciences, University of California, with funds derived from the 
National Science Foundation, and to Professor Louise!! from the Ford Foundation. 
A portion of this paper was presented by Dr. Diamond to the National Medicolegal 
Symposium, sponsored by the American Medical Association and the American Bar 
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of pain? But these are subordinate to, and distinguishable from, the 
the central questions which are at the heart of the litigation. 
In such a situation the expert witness should have little or no 
difficulty defining his own functional role in the trial. He is to 
supply particular, specialized information to the court-information 
derived both from his direct observation of the plaintiff and from 
his fund of general professional knowledge about the structure and 
mechanics of the human body and the nature of the injuries which 
the body suffers from external forces. If the witness is a man of high 
integrity, experience, and professional competency, he will find it 
easy to communicate to the court which of his answers are based 
upon firm, objective facts and which veer off into more speculative 
hypotheses. He need not become defensive about his technical 
knowledge and his expertise, and he should be able to avoid be-
coming involved in those issues at trial which clearly have no re-
lationship to his area of competency. 
Particularly, the form in which such an expert's evidence is 
presented in the courtroom should not normally concern him seri-
ously. He can testify almost as capably if his evidence is given in 
reply to a series of questions as if it is given as a continuous narra-
tive. Cross-examination should hold no terrors for him. It should 
be of no grave consequence to him whether the questions are pro-
posed as real or as hypothetical, provided they be put intelligibly. 
In short, this expert witness should be capable of easily adapting 
himself and his testimony to whatever rules, restrictions, and modes 
of presentation the law, in its own wisdom, deems best. Most es-
pecially, he should experience no need to involve himself emotion-
ally or intellectually in the outcome of the trial. 
It is possible to look upon the rules of evidence simply as logical, 
necessary devices to ensure that all of this takes place: that the ex-
pert witness be truly an expert and that he be exposed if he is not; 
that his evidence be objective and relevant and that it be presented 
in such a _fashion that its weight and significance may be judged. 
The ordinary rules of evidence can, in most instances, ensure that 
the expert is not drawn into issues that do not concern him or that 
could be better determined by other kinds of witnesses giving other 
kinds of evidence. 
Thus, in a well-run personal injury trial, the orthopedic surgeon 
of competence and integrity can be close to the ideal of the unin-
volved, objective, impartial expert. If this ideal is not too frequently 
achieved, it is not necessarily because the rules of trial procedure are 
at fault. It is more likely the result of human failings and the ex-
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igencies of the expert's professional practice. Often, surgeons habitu-
ally will be either a defendant's or a plaintiff's witness. Some 
degree of bias is inevitable and its nature depends upon the orienta-
tion of the surgeon's medico-legal practice. Permanent emotional 
bias may also exist within the expert's own personality. He may be 
strongly identified with authority and conservative ideas of individ-
ual responsibility and determined, at least unconsciously, that the 
plaintiff receive a minimum of compensation. Or he may over-
identify with the patient's position as the underdog and engage in a 
crusade from the witness stand on the patient's behalf. But these de-
fects should be demonstrable by the questioning of a skillful at-
torney. No basic change in procedure or departure from the time-
honored adversary system is necessary to cope with these problems. 
The fact that orthopedic surgeons for reasons of temperament and 
training frequently dislike the adversary system, as physicians often 
do, is not of great materiality to the law, except as it limits avail-
able competent expertise. 
There is no occasion here to attempt to pass judgment on the 
various proposals for substantive change in handling personal in-
jury litigation. Certainly the introduction of pre-trial discovery pro-
cedures has facilitated and imp7:oved the use of expert testimony, 
and it can be expected that in time the extraordinary increase of 
such cases will bring further reforms. But we see no reason to con-
template fundamental change in the basic functions and roles of 
such expert witnesses, except that the movement to so-called "im-
partial" expertise to supplement partisan testimony may receive 
additional impetus. 
I. THE MODERN PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT 
The present-day psychiatric expert witness, particularly if he is 
of psychodynamic or psychoanalytic orientation, poses a vastly differ-
ent and more complex problem for traditional trial procedure 
and legal theory. And it is open to question whether the conven-
tional rules of evidence and procedure are capable of adequately 
coping with the psychiatrist's intrusion into the legal process. Some 
would, perhaps, wish to deal with the psychiatrist's trouble-making 
propensities by thrusting him completely out of the courtroom, rele-
gating him to pre- and post-conviction phases of the judicial process.2 
Others would temper and restrict his role to that of the traditional 
expert. Still others propose new rules to meet specifically this new 
2. 6 HOUTS, TRAUMA 4:1 (1964); ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND passim (1958). 
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kind of expertise:1 But neither the statutory nor the appellate law 
seems fully to appreciate the extent and depth of the changes which 
have come about in the use of psychiatric testimony on the trial 
court level. There have been only limited attempts to define the 
legitimate boundaries of such evidence and to develop broad gen-
eral principles to direct the increasing use of psychiatric evidence 
into sound channels of legal progress. 
It is true that in some cases the role of the psychiatric expert 
witness is nearly as well-defined as that of an orthopedic surgeon or 
any other medical expert.4 When the psychiatrist testifies as to the 
existence of an overt psychosis, such as schizophrenia, and supports 
a plea of insantity in a murder trial, or when he describes the in-
capacity of a conversion hysterical paralysis following an industrial 
injury in a compensation case, he may very well be as impartial and 
as objectively scientific as any surgeon describing a fractured leg. 
Furthermore, his role in the trial may be sharply restricted to spe-
cific, technical questions, and he need not involve himself in the 
ultimate issues of the litigation. In these instances the traditional 
rules and procedures work well. 
But in recent years there has been a sharp increase in quite a 
different type of psychiatric evidence which, we believe, performs a 
different function in the trial. This change has come about, we 
think, because, on the one hand, of a much more sophisticated at-
titude by the law toward psychiatric and psychological problems, 
and, on the other hand, because of a radical change in the nature of 
psychiatry. In the late nineteenth century, psychiatry was very much 
a sub-speciality of neurology. Already by then neurology had be-
come an extraordinarily precise branch of medicine. By meticulous 
examination of the patient's reflexes and sensory and motor func-
tions, it was possible to localize and describe with exactness the 
lesion of the nervous system. 
"Then, knowing the location of the lesion, one could often 
deduce the etiological agent, and sometimes prescribe a re-
medial treatment. The neurologists were able, through these 
methods, to demonstrate the existence of hundreds of discrete 
3. Dieden &: Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence and Full Disclosure in the Criminal 
T.rial, 52 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 543 (1964). 
4. Perhaps the converse is more often true. Because of lack of visibly demonstrable 
pathology, the surgeon may have to present expert testimony of an intuitive, judgmental 
quality approaching that given by the psychiatrist. In such an instance, the real value 
of the surgeon's testimony lies not in the so-called objective facts, but rather in the 
skill, experience, knowledge, and judgment of the expert. Quaere: might not the gen-
eralization be made that the more difficult the trial situation, the more controversial 
the issues to be resolved, and the more uncertain the balance of evidence, the more 
likely the expert testimony, be it surgical, medical, pathological, criminalistic or ballistic, 
will approach the subjective, intuitive and holistic quality of the psychiatrist's expertise 
to be described infra? 
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neurological diseases with particular, well-defined, and uni-
formly located lesions, disclosed by reasonably constant sub-
jective and objective symptoms and pathological manifestations 
of body function. It was anticipated that the same would be 
accomplished in the area of mental disease."5 
This anticipation was never realized. The development of Freudian 
psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories, with their emphasis 
on psychotherapy and dynamic formulation rather than static diag-
nosis, created a completely different climate for the development of 
psychiatric knowledge. 
"Modem psychotherapeutic psychiatry as practiced today by 
well-trained physicians conceptualizes mental illness as a com-
plex interplay of forces: instinctual as well as acquired and en-
vironmental social forces interacting with the defenses and 
adaptive functions of the ego .... Obviously such a dynamic 
conceptualization of mental illness sacrifices much of the pre-
cision and discreteness so eagerly sought by the early neurol-
ogists. But what has been gained has been a marvelously useful, 
psychologically broad concept of all human behavior, not just 
of gross mental abnormality. Medical psychology has expanded 
far beyond its old borders and has contributed significant in-
sights into almost every field of human activity-the arts as 
well as the sciences."0 
Because the new breed of psychoanalytic psychiatrists were so few 
in number and so intensely preoccupied with therapy, there was a 
long time lag before twentieth century psychiatry was brought into 
the courtroom. By and large, forensic psychiatry was left by default 
to the neuropsychiatrist whose orientation was physical rather than 
psychological, and custodial rather than therapeutic. Following 
World War II, there was a rapid increase in the number of psy-
chiatrists. Many outstanding European psychoanalytic pioneers had 
emigrated to the United States just before the war, and they now ex-
erted a profound influence upon the clinical and theoretical train-
ing of the younger American psychiatrists. 
Today, American psychiatry is a complex amalgamation of 
Freudian, Neo-Freudian, socio-cultural, and biological concepts and 
theories. The emphasis on psychotherapy continues unabated by the 
significant new developments in pharmacotherapy. Psychological, 
sociological, physical, and pharmacological methods of treatment 
are not regarded as competitive alternatives, but as supplements to 
each other in the treatment of the total human being. 
Much of this change in the psychiatric climate has still not fully 
5. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 189, 195 
(1962). 
6. Ibid. 
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penetrated into the courtroom. The forensic psychiatrist is still apt 
to be someone who talks like a nineteenth century neurologist. But 
the changeover is now proceeding much more rapidly and the out-
standing legal psychiatrists of today are closely identified with the 
psychoanalytic movement. 
So today, the psychiatrist in the courtroom may be called upon 
to answer questions of a very different nature than would have been 
thought of a hundred, fifty, or even twenty years ago. And the psy-
chiatrist responds to these questions very differently than he would 
have in pre-psychoanalytic years. 
Undoubtedly the development of psychoanalytic theories and 
their widespread popularization have contributed to the sophistica-
tion of the law. But other factors have contributed too: the growing 
preoccupation of the law with the individualization of justice, and 
the greater emphasis on the rights, uniqueness, and worth of human 
life. In a century when powerful social and political forces through-
out the world have tended to devalue these elements of humanity, 
our law often has stood as an ever-strengthening bulwark in 
support of such values. This is particularly evident in the diminish-
ing harshness of the criminal law and the greatly increased emphasis 
on rehabilitation, rather than mere punishment, as the goal of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. 
Whatever the reasons for the changes might be, modem psycho-
dynamic psychiatry fits in very well with these humanitarian values 
and goals. Lady Barbara Wootton said: 
"Without question, therefore, in the contemporary attitude 
towards 'anti-social behaviour, psychiatry and humanitarianism 
have marched hand in hand. Just because it is so much in 
keeping with the mental atmosphere of a scientifically-minded 
age, the medical treatment of social deviants has been a most 
powerful, perhaps even the most powerful, reinforcement of 
humanitarian impulses; for to-day the prestige of human pro-
posals is immensely enhanced if these are expressed in the 
idiom of medical science. Indeed we might go so far as to say 
that, even if the intellectual foundations of current psychiatry 
were to be proved to be wholly unsound, and even if psychiatric 
'science' was exposed as nothing more than fantasy, we might 
yet have cause to be grateful for the result of so beneficient a 
delusion."7 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES 
The psychological sciences differ from the biological sciences in 
that the subject matter of the former is not visible.8 The investiga-
7. WOOlTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 206 (1959). 
8. In this the psychological sciences resemble modem physics, much of whose 
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tor is able to have a first-hand acquaintance only with his own con-
scious mind-never with his own unconscious, and never directly 
with the conscious or unconscious minds of others. The investigator 
must therefore rely upon inferences made from derivatives: speech, 
non-verbal communication, actions, behavior. For example, a psycho-
analyst never actually knows what his patient dreams. He knows 
only what the patient tells him about his dream, and there is reason 
to believe that the telling of a dream is much different from the 
dreaming process itself. 
Furthermore, psychological experimentation is strictly limited. 
One can rarely devise an experiment that would have the precision 
taken for granted by the chemist and the physicist. Scientific ex-
perimentation consists largely in rigorously controlling irrelevant 
factors and isolating the variable under investigation. Techniques 
for doing this are not easy to devise with human psychology. Im-
portant ethical and humane considerations block the performance of 
crucial experiments. So the psychologist and psychiatrist rely heavily 
upon natural experimental opportunities: that is, careful observa-
tion of interactions which spontaneously occur in certain partially 
controlled situations. So-called clinical research consists of the obser-
vations of patients in situations in which diagnosis and treatment are 
the primary goals; much of the observation is concerned with the 
interaction between the clinician and the patient. Thus, the clin-
ician, himself-his ability to observe, to interact, to feel, and to 
sense intuitively-becomes the chief instrument of research. 
With few exceptions, such as the electroencephalogram, nothing 
is observed, described, or measured except derivatives of the mental 
processes. In order to make deductions and inferences about the 
mind-both its normal and pathological functions-the observer 
must have a theoretical framework in which to order, explain, and 
interpret his observations of the mental derivatives. Further, his 
inferences, as well as his observations, are strongly colored by the 
qualities of his observing instrument: that is, his own personality, 
experience, and theoretical training. 
Psychiatry and psychology thus are not exact sciences. Observa-
tions about an individual that can be quantified, such as an I.Q., 
are of doubtful validity and often of no relevancy to the kind of 
information required to answer questions posed by the law. Some 
judges are fond of pontificating that psychiatry is not an exact 
subject matter (e.g., atoms and sub-atomic particles) is not visible. The physicist, too, 
must make inferences from his observations of derivatives of the phenomena which 
he wishes to study. 
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science; therefore they feel free to reject all psychiatric evidence. It 
is often within their power to do so. But they must not harbor the 
illusion that psychiatry and psychology will ever be "exact" in the 
sense that these judges would like: that is, precise, quantitative, ex-
perimentally verified, and with substantially unanimous agreement 
of all behavorial scientists as to observation and theory. 
The law must recognize that the usefulness of psychiatric evi-
dence is not determined by the exactness or infallibility of the wit-
ness' science. Rather, it is measured by the probability that what he 
has to say offers more information and better comprehension of the 
human behavior which the law wishes to understand. The psychia-
trist offers a hypothesis explaining a specific set of human thoughts, 
feelings, and actions. He then attaches values to the phenomena he 
describes: certain feelings are "normal," certain thoughts or actions 
are "pathological," certain behavior is "compulsive," other behavior 
is "free," etc. The legal usefulness of such hypotheses and values will 
depend less upon their scientific precision than upon their wisdom. 
III. THE USEFUL PSYCHIATRIST 
Following this line of reasoning, then, the useful forensic psy-
chiatrist must possess two characteristics: he must be a wise man, 
and he must fully comprehend and be sympathetic to the goals of 
justice-not only to the ends, but to the means of the law as well. 
But this is precisely where the difficulty with forensic psychiatry lies. 
The psychiatric expert is apt not to be a very wise man, but rather 
a possessor of technical knowledge of some depth, but little breadth. 
He seldom comprehends or is sympathetic to the legal process. The 
situation is worsened when the law treats the psychiatrist as if he 
were similar to a surgeon, a laboratory scientist, a ballistics expert, 
or any other technical expert who is experienced in providing trial 
courts with specialized information. The result is a pseudo-scientific 
veneer for the psychiatrist and his testimony, behind which the lack 
of wisdom and lack of legal comprehension are concealed. 
A good psychiatrist may very well possess a great deal of wisdom 
about human nature, particularly concerning the deviant varieties 
with which the law is concerned. A wise man differs from ordi-
nary mortals by virtue of his knowledge, his capacity to observe 
perceptively, his self-discipline, and his ability to integrate infor-
mation derived from many different sources into a meaningful 
whole. Most of all, he is capable of surmounting, or at least dis-
counting, his own prejudices and preconceptions and of overriding 
the obvious and often glib conclusions based upon common sense 
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alone.11 Common sense conclusions, particularly about human nature, 
are not necessarily the embodiment of the wisdom of the ages. "Com-
mon sense" may be the superficial rationalizations by which we 
avoid the real and deeper meanings of the human mind. Wise men 
recognize this and are prepared to accept explanations of human 
behavior and natural phenomena that seem esoteric and enigmatic 
to the less wise. Hence the mystery which has always been associated 
with the oracle. 
In truth, the psychiatrist is rapidly becoming a sort of oracle to 
be piously consulted by the courts of law, all accomplished with ap-
propriate rituals of pseudo-scientific jargon in reply to non-scientific 
questions such as: "Is the defendant capable of distinguishing right 
from ·wrong?" or "Did the defendant possess the capacity to enter-
tain malice aforethought at the instant of the criminal act?" or 
"Is the pain in the leg of the plaintiff the result of a genuine emo-
tional trauma sustained in an accident or is it imaginary, reflecting 
his motivation to get something for nothing?" 
Recently one of the authors received a letter from a judge who 
is chairman of a crime commission in his state. The letter requested 
information as to how a law might be formulated that would guaran-
tee that no sexual offender would be discharged from an institution 
if he might commit a second offense after his release. The only 
logical answer to such an inquiry is the suggestion that the institu-
tion be placed in charge of a skilled and certified fortune-teller. 
Psychiatrists generally do not possess such abilities to predict the 
future. 
IV. THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES 
If the psychiatrist is to be useful to the law, not as an oracle, 
fortune-teller, or pseudo-exact scientist, but rather as a man possessed 
of a certain modicum of wisdom about human beings and their be-
havior, it might be desirable for the law to modify some of its pro-
cedures in order to facilitate this. Some of the traditional ways of 
doing business in a courtroom might not be the most appropriate or 
useful for communicating what the psychiatrist has to say to the 
trier of fact. Nor are the traditional ways necessarily the best to re-
veal whether in truth the psychiatrist is a wise man who compre-
hends the goals of the law. 
We wish to limit the remainder of our discussion in this paper to 
a few of the possible modifications of procedure which might im-
prove psychiatric testimony and which would be more compatible 
9. Louisell 8: Diamond, Law and Psychiatry-Detente, Entente or Concomitance1, 
50 CoRNELL L.Q. 217 (1965). 
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with the psychiatrist's true role in the decision-making process of 
the trial. No claim is made that these are radical innovations. 
A. The Fallacy of Impartiality 
One of the authors has had considerable experience as a psy-
chiatric expert for the defense in criminal trials. Taking advantage 
of judicial leniency he has experimented with different modes of 
participation in the criminal process. Out of this experience has 
come the conviction that the psychiatrist achieves a more significant, 
and at the same time, more honest and ethical relationship to the 
trial process if many of the customary pretenses of the expert witness 
are discarded. 
The law too much assumes that psychiatric experts, especially 
court-appointed ones but to a degree also those called by parties, are 
impartial; that they furnish neutral expertise rather than professional 
viewpoint. The reality of this is open to question.10 In former years, 
the psychiatrist who relied solely upon the obvious and objectively 
visible evidence of mental disease and who spent only a brief time 
with the defendant could, perhaps, retain a kind of impartiality. But 
now, when most of the better trained psychiatrists are keenly inter-
ested in the deeper and more obscure workings of the pathological 
mind and may develop a close and intimate emotional relationship 
with the defendant-patient through many hours of probing clinical 
examination, it becomes difficult to continue the pretext of detach-
ment and impartiality. 
Of even greater importance is the present trend toward a closer 
and more prolonged working relationship between the psychiatrist 
and the attorney. It is not unusual for an attorney (either prosecu-
tion or defense) to consult a psychiatrist very early in a criminal 
case. The attorney may depend heavily upon the advice and ex-
perience of the psychiatrist in planning the basic strategy of the 
entire legal proceeding, from the preliminary investigations to the 
concluding argument to the jury. Not infrequently the mental state 
of the defendant is the sole issue in dispute during the trial, and 
the problems of the mental state-the mens rea-may be most com-
licated and difficult of demonstration and resolution. Hence, the 
attorney may wisely utilize the collaboration of the psychiatrist at 
every step of the way. 
Should the law then permit the illusion that the psychiatrist re-
mains impartial and outside the adversary system? We think not. 
10. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES OF CRIMINAL PSYCHO• 
DYNAMICS 221 (1959), reprinted (in part) in LouISELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 
1291 (1962). 
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The remedy must lie in the full disclosure to the jury of the psy-
chiatrist's role and function in the particular case. And it should 
not be necessary to drag this information from the reluctant wit-
ness through sharp and vigorous cross-examination. Rather, the 
psychiatrist should be prepared to describe his complete relation-
ship to the defense (or to the prosecution) in his primary testimony 
as a legitimate part of the clinical information upon which his 
opinion is based. In this way, not only the opinion of the expert but 
also his role and participation become matters for the jury to 
weigh. 
B. The Form of the Testimony 
Traditionally, the expert witness presents his testimony, as does 
the ordinary witness, in the form of direct answers to specific 
questions proposed by the attorney. This interrogatory form of 
communication probably developed out of the necessity of present-
ing evidence in tiny fragments, each fragment an entity in itself 
which could then be evaluated, determined if competent, relevant, 
and material, and then affirmed or contradicted by further interro-
gation. This may be the best method for the presentation of so-called 
objective facts, although this has been incisively questioned by able 
observers. In any event, it is gravely doubtful that it is the best 
means of communicating the psychological essence of the human 
mind. 
Only a few decades ago psychiatrists were trained to imitate the 
systematic precision of the physician and surgeon. The mental ex-
amination, as set forth in the medical records of that time, followed 
very closely the form used by other physicians. It was divided into 
a great many different elements, each with a suitable rubric such as 
chief complaint, present illness, family history, past history, develop-
mental history, educational and employment record, orientation to 
time, place, and person, recent and recall memory, contact with 
reality, insight, affect, and many more specific items, ending with 
a diagnosis, prognosis, and prescription for treatment. The psycho-
dynamic psychiatrist of today no longer describes his patients this 
way, and he avoids thinking in such a fragmented manner. The 
human mind, normal or pathological, is best and most meaningfully 
described as a continuous story that begins with the individual's 
birth, or even before, with his family, social, and cultural heritage, 
and ends with the present moment which, in a criminal trial, means 
the defendant sitting in the presence of the jury, under its scru-
tiny, and awaiting its decision. 
It is no small task for the psychiatrist to describe and interpret 
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all of this from the witness stand. Particularly, it is difficult, b.ut 
nevertheless essential, that he convincingly communicate to the jury 
the relevancy of the total life history of the defendant to that critical 
moment of the alleged criminal act upon which the jury must pass 
judgment. 
To do this successfully and meaningfully, the psychiatrist must 
use the narrative form. He has a story to tell, a story of another 
man's whole life, thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears, fantasies, loves, 
hates, delusions, and dreams. Unavoidably, the clinical history, like 
all good stories, will contain exaggerations for the sake of emphasis, 
discrepancies and inconsistencies, loose ends, and unresolved contra-
dictions. But these can be dealt with in cross-examination. For it is 
in clarifying, criticizing, verifying, and validating that the technique 
of question and answer works best. 
So we propose that the psychiatrist be permitted and encouraged 
to tell his story as a narrative, all in one piece, taking as long as reason-
ably necessary, to relate to the jury who he, the witness, is, how he 
came to be involved with the defendant, what functions he has played 
in the development of the case, his interaction with the defendant, 
how he elicited the information he received, how he reconstructed the 
events of the defendant's life, and what he has inferred about the 
secret and invisible processes of the defendant's mind. 
Then, upon the completion of this story, it becomes appropriate 
for the criticism and clarification to begin. For this, the traditional 
techniques of cross-examination seem well suited. It is in cross-
examination that our method of utilizing expertise seems to excel 
in relation to typical European methods.11 
C. Full Disclosure and the Hypothetical Question 
It is recognized that a few situations exist in law (as, for example, 
an issue of testamentary capacity) where no approach other than the 
hypothetical question is normally possible. But if one accepts the 
principle that the validity of the psychiatrist's observations and in-
ferences is dependent upon the totality of his approach, upon his 
taking everything, including his own personal and subjective inter-
action with his patient, into account, then the hypothetical question 
generally becomes a dubious technique. 
No hypothetical question can ever be formulated which would 
contain sufficient facts to justify a really valid psychiatric inference. 
This is because the modern, psychodynamically oriented psychiatrist 
simply does not assemble diagnostic facts A, B, and C about his 
11. See SCHLESINGER, CAsES ON COMPARATIVE I.Aw 224, 250 (1959). 
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patient and thus arrive at conclusion D. The psychiatrist may be 
very much interested in observed phenomena, such as mannerisms, 
delusional and hallucinated behavior, and the like, but he can not 
derive a valid conclusion from such phenomena until he puts them 
together with his mm subjective relationship to the examinee within 
the context of the latter's total background. There are few, if any, 
pathognomonic signs of mental disease. 
The problem of the hypothetical question usually arises in a 
criminal trial under two circumstances. First, it arises when the psy-
chiatrist has not actually examined the defendant. Such hypothetical 
testimony is of doubtful worth and often of dubious ethical quality. 
Secondly, it arises when it is used as a device to restrict the informa-
tion admitted to the jury. A defendant may not wish to testify on 
his mm behalf, being unwilling to adroit the facts of the deed. The 
strategy of the trial may demand that all sorts of information about 
the crime and the criminal be withheld from the jury's knowledge, 
including evidence of previous offenses. The hypothetical question 
can be used for this purpose, restricting the psychiatrist to only cer-
tain facts and aspects of the case. This is the defendant's constitu-
tional right. But it is not necessarily the psychiatrist's ethical duty 
to cooperate with such strategy. He should not and, if he is conscien-
tious, he ·will not, wholly shrug off the responsibility £or the conse-
quences of his testimony. 
There are two basic and radically different strategies available to 
the defense in a criminal trial involving a psychiatric defense. The 
defense can, in effect, say, "We adroit nothing-prove your case." 
Or the defense can say, "We adroit all the objective facts, we want 
you to hear the total account of this man's life, mind, and deed, and 
after you have heard everything you, the jury, will be better able 
to reach a just decision." 
It seems to us that the psychiatrist may well have conscientious 
scruples as to the legitimacy of a role in the typical "admit nothing" 
defense. Of what possible use can such a role typically have other than 
to obscure the issues and befuddle the jury with professional jargon 
and abstract theories? Good psychiatric testimony generally is com-
patible only with full disclosure. It is, in fact, a type of full dis-
closure which goes far beyond that customary in the courtroom. The 
jury is asked to listen to and consider evidence of a type rarely dis-
closed in normal human relations. The defendant relinquishes all 
right of privacy, both as to his past and as to the inner depths of 
his mind, even as to matters of which he, himself, may be unaware. 
We doubt that compromise can be possible here. To be willing 
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to disclose in depth only those aspects about the self of the defendant 
that are strategically useful can quickly place the psychiatrist in the 
position• of a dupe, in the position of one whose knowledge and 
skills are being used for purposes foreign to the values of his own 
discipline. Here, the remedy lies with the ethical and professional 
responsibility of the psychiatrist rather than with a change of the 
legal rules. The psychiatrist may insist that he will not participate 
in legal work unless he is permitted to disclose all. And he may 
wish to keep a careful watch over the uses to which his testimony 
is put. 
It is true that the law can exercise its prerogative of saying to 
the psychiatrist, "This is none of your business. We want the an-
swers to certain technical questions, and what we do with your 
answers is no concern of yours." But the price of such legal arrogance 
is the limitation of courtroom psychiatric expertise to the incom-
petent, the indifferent, and the pseudo-scientific purveyor of jargon. 
The leaders and the thinkers of the psychiatric profession simply 
will not participate on such terms.12 
However, it would be a sad mistake for the psychiatrist to assume 
that he is qualified by training or experience to dictate to the lawyer 
the precise tactics of the criminal trial. And to threaten boycott for 
non-compliance would certainly not improve the rapport between 
the two professions, nor would it benefit either the defendant or 
society. Obviously, there must be a middle ground of necessary com-
promise that will not offend the ethical sensibilities of the most com-
petent psychiatrist and at the same time will recognize the realities 
of the legal process. Most psychiatrists are primarily therapists, and 
they de.rive their sense of what is proper and responsible from the 
requirements of the therapeutic situation. But the legal trial is not 
an extension of the therapeutic process, and the psychiatrist is called 
upon to alter his perspective when he changes his role to that of ex-
pert witness. He needs the help of the lawyer in making this shift, 
and he must be willing to allow the lawyer to bear the final respon-
sibility for the tactical decisions involved. 
D. The Problem of Self-Incrimination 
Candor compels acknowledgment that the psychiatrist's desid-
eratum of "full disclosure" in the courtroom potentially confronts 
the principle against compulsory self-incrimination. We do not here 
attempt a reappraisal of the contemporary significance of that prin-
12. As, for an example, Freud's reluctance. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of 
the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 63 (1961). See also LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 'if 1.03 (1960). 
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ciple's two discrete elements--that pertaining to the right of any 
person to refuse to answer incriminating questions and that which 
has to do with a defendant's right wholly to avoid questioning; nor 
do we examine whether the value of the latter element is now inde-
pendently achieved at least in substantial part by due process and 
related developments.13 The right of a defendant generally to stand 
mute, whether phrased in terms of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, due process, presumption of innocence, or the prosecution's 
obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable. doubt, is a corner-
stone of our accusatorial system.14 Any chipping of any essential part 
of that cornerstone is tolerable, if at all, only after deliberate and 
basic reappraisal of current problems in the light of historical dangers. 
Therefore, the Bar and the public should be cautioned that psy-
chiatry is susceptible of surreptitious use as an illegitimate chipping 
tool. Psychiatry, with its special investigatory devices of persuasion, 
insinuation into a suspect's confidence, "lie detection," hypnosis, 
"truth serums," projective tests, and other procedures, can flagrantly 
violate basic constitutional and other personal rights. Sometimes 
such violations have been tolerated or at least ignored by courts,15 
but generally they have been disapproved.16 Current developments 
of the right to counsel and guarantees against coerced confessions17 
may excite a corresponding impressment of the jail doctor or police 
psychiatrist into the role of sleuth. Such a physician by falsely play-
ing the part of helper, healer, or sympathizer can sometimes obtain 
information from a suspect that is foreclosed from other investiga-
tors. Few would deny that deceit is all the more reprehensible when 
garbed in the benign robes of physician-healer, and we hold no 
brief for such medical trickery. 
But can, and should, society permanently afford a defense based 
primarily on psychiatric evidence when the defendant simultaneously 
relies on the privilege against self-incrimination? Can a jury rea-
sonably be expected to place faith in psychiatric testimony if the 
defendant is not also willing to demonstrate from his own mouth 
and behavior the psychopathology upon which the psychiatrist bases 
his opinion? In a word, can the psychiatrist's ideal of "full dis-
closure" coexist with a mute defendant? 
l!I. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination-Roger Traynor Con• 
fronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 89 (1965). See also Louisell, Criminal Discovery-
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 87 (1961). 
14. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
15. See People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 1!6, 41, 338 P .2d 416 (1959). 
16. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). 
17. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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In our present state of imperfect knowledge, we feel that these 
are questions that formal law should currently pretermit-that is, 
they are questions that should be left to society and juries. We cer-
tainly would not now urge abrogation of the privilege against self-
incrimination, or related due process or procedural guarantees, 
as a condition of a defendant's right to use psychiatric evidence. 
Protection against tyrannous or othenvise excessively harsh prose-
cution is too important a part of freedom to be unqualifiedly sub-
ordinated to the assumed probative values of any species of evidence, 
including psychiatric.18 We see the problem essentially as one of 
education rather than legal compulsion. After all, if the strategy 
of full disclosure is as good as we think it often can be and if it alone 
will permit the trier of fact to be truly convinced of the validity and 
relevancy of the psychological evidence, it should not require the 
force of formal law to gain acceptance. It will come into common 
usage in proportion to the degree that the defense learns to appreci-
ate its usefulness, that juries can be convinced of its validity, and 
that the psychiatrist, in shifting his role from therapist to expert 
witness, understands that he must not also shift out from under his 
basic ethical and professional responsibilities. 
E. The Problem of Hearsay 
The psychiatrist, even more than other physicians, relies upon 
statements of the patient, facts and opinion gathered from relatives, 
friends, and others, as well as observations and opinions of other 
professionals in order to formulate his own opinion of his patient's 
mental condition. For strictly therapeutic purposes, especially in 
psychoanalytic therapy, he may wish to exclude all information 
which does not come directly from his patient; but this is done for 
reasons of rapport and transference and to avoid certain therapeutic 
complications. It is always recognized by the therapist that such a 
restriction sharply diminishes the accuracy and objectivity of his 
diagnostic formulations. However, in nearly every instance in which 
a psychiatrist desires within a reasonable time limit to reach con-
clusions about a patient that are as valid and reliable as possible, 
he will fully utilize every available scrap of information which he 
can get, no matter what the source. Further, because the opinion of 
the psychiatrist is derived from his own highly subjective, total im-
pression of the patient, it is impossible for him to divide his opinion 
into fragments. He cannot claim that a particular portion of his 
opinion was derived from direct observations of the patient while 
18. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 287-314 (1960). 
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another portion comes from third parties. He cannot even con-
fidently say that in the absence of such and such information he 
might have reached a different conclusion. 
If the psychiatrist is well trained and experienced, he will resist 
with all his powers such attempts to particularize and fragment. 
Modern psychodynamic psychiatry is firmly based upon the premise 
that the human mind (and body) is indivisible-that human thought, 
feeling, and behavior are not a mosaic of individual faculties. All 
of the psychiatrist's professional education has been directed toward 
the development of a fluid, amorphous, sentient comprehension of 
the inner life of his patient. Every tiny portion of information com-
municated to him becomes an integral part of this comprehension, 
and he cannot strike from the re!=ord of his clinical judgment ma-
terial which came to him from sources to which the law takes ob-
jection. The result, as expressed in his opinion as an expert witness, 
may not be very precise and may offend those who nurture the 
"exact science" myth; but the opinion may still be arguably valid, 
reliable, and pertinent to the legal issues. 
It is in this area of third-party information that there exists the 
greatest discrepancy between what is demanded by good clinical 
practice and what supposedly is required by good law. The law 
wishes the expert to base his opinion only upon first-hand observa-
tion. The strictest rule is that "opinion of a medical expert as to the 
physical or mental condition of some person involved in the pro-
ceeding, or as to the cause or effect of some disease or injury with 
which such person is afflicted, based upon information from third 
persons out of court, is inadmissible."19 
Objections to the strict hearsay rule have been expressed by 
many.20 Some jurisdictions have allowed some exceptions: for ex-
ample, California allows an expert to base his opinion in part upon 
third-party information when the trier of fact has before him cor-
roberative evidence from which he could draw the same conclusion 
19. 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 866.5 (Cum. Supp. 1964). 
20. "To deny the competency of a physician who does not know his facts from 
personal observation alone is to reject medical testimony almost in its entirety. To 
allow any physician to testify who claims to know solely by personal experience is to 
appropriate the witness-stand to imposters. Medical science is a mass of transmitted 
and collated data from numerous quarters; the generalizations which are the result 
of one man's personal observation exclusively are the least acceptable of all. The law 
must recognize the methods of medical science. It cannot stultify itself by establishing, 
for judicial inquiries, a rule never considered necessary by the medical profession itself. 
It is enough for a physician, testifying to a medical fact, that he is by training and 
occupation a physician; whether his source of information for that particular fact is in 
part or entirety the hearsay of his fellow-practitioners and investigators, is immaterial." 
3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 687. See also MORGAN, MAGUIRE&: '\\TEINSTEIN, CASES 
ON EVIDENCE 232 (1957); Rheingold, The Basis Of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 
473, 475 (1962). 
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that the expert assumes from the third party's statements.21 A num-
ber of other jurisdictions have permitted various degrees of excep-
tion, but always with some qualifying restrictions. For example, in 
Yellow Cab Company v. Henderson,22 a physician-witness was 
allowed to testify as to third-party statements, but only because both 
the physician and the third party (the mother, acting as the nurse 
and attendant of the three-year-old plaintiff) were in close attend-
ance upon the patient. In Jenkins v. United States23 the appellate 
court overruled the trial court's exclusion of a psychiatrist's testi-
mony, stating: "But we agree with the leading commentators that the 
better reasoned authorities admit opinion testimony based, in part, 
upon reports of others which are not in evidence but which the 
expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profes-
sion."24 
Nevertheless, there are a good many decisions to the contrary, 
and the annotation of Yellow Cab Company v. Henderson25 can 
state without fear of contradiction in most jurisdictions, "The 
opinion of a medical expert as to the sanity of a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding based partly upon the statements of third per-
sons out of court is generally considered inadmissible." Yet, what 
actually occurs in the trial courts is often quite different. 
There seems to be two ways in which this exclusionary rule is 
evaded in many trial courts. One way is for the trial court simply to 
ignore the rule. Repeatedly, one of us has given testimony based 
upon clinical facts obtained from a wide variety of third parties 
under all sorts of different circumstances. Seldom were objections 
raised. Today, particularly in a criminal trial, the psychiatrist often 
has a great deal of freedom in the presentation of his clinical evi-
dence-considerably more than the appellate decisions generally 
indicate. It is not infrequent that the judge in a criminal trial exhi-
bits great flexibility in applying the rules of evidence to witnesses 
for the defense. And because the prosecution usually cannot appeal 
from a judgment based on a verdict of acquittal, a leniency which, 
if it were for the benefit of the prosecution, would likely result in 
appeal and reversal goes by without professional notice when it im-
proves the case of the defense. Consequently, there is a tendency to 
hold the prosecution's expert to a more rigid and traditional pre-
sentation of his evidence than the witness for the defense. The 
21. People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196, 204, 208 P.2d 974, 979 (1949). 
22. 183 Md. 546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944). 
23. 307 F.2d 637 (App. D.C. 1962). 
24. Id. at 641. 
25. Annot., 175 A.L.R. 275, 287 (1944). 
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remedy is, perhaps, for the appellate courts frankly to recognize the 
changes which are already occurring, critically to appraise their 
desirability, and to clarify the general legal principles which should 
govern such testimony. 
The other way of skirting the evidentiary rules is for the expert 
witness simply to claim that he has based his opinion solely upon 
his own direct observations. True, he talked to the relatives and ex-
amined the reports of the nurses, psychologists, and other physicians, 
but somehow these other sources of information were all peripheral 
to his clinical judgment and he was uninfluenced by them. We sus-
pect that this is very often the device used by the expert. But we be-
lieve it to be very undesirable because, first, it is not being truthful; 
second, it deprives the court and the jury of the educational value of 
knowing exactly how the expert does arrive at his opinion; and, 
third, it produces the utterly false impression that a medical conclu-
sion based upon direct observation alone is in some mysterious way 
superior to a conclusion based upon full information derived from a 
variety of sources. Would the judge who endorses this kind of bad 
medicine in the courtroom tolerate it for one moment in the hospi-
tal were it to concern his own health? 
It is time, we believe, for the law in all jurisdictions and in all 
circumstances to bring itself into contact with reality on this issue. 
The law must decide whether it is only playing games with the psy-
chiatric expert-games with arbitrary and capricious rules-or 
whether it genuinely wishes to have the benefit of the psychiatrist's 
skill and knowledge. The law must determine whether it truly 
wishes to know how the psychiatrist formed his opinion and the 
kinds of clinical information upon which that opinion was based. In 
short, the law must choose between having good medicine or bad 
medicine in its courtrooms. 
The psychiatrist is perfectly aware of the fact that the clinical 
history obtained from the patient is distorted and self-serving. He 
knows that the information provided by family and friends may have 
relatively little validity and that the psychological test report, 
or the nurses' notes, or the consultation reports of other physicians 
are not the whole story of the case. The psychiatrist is especially 
trained to assimilate information from a wide variety of sources, to 
evaluate each fact, to discount some, to emphasize others, and to 
ignore still others. He then makes his own personal observations of 
his patient, puts everything together, and arrives at a conclusion. 
This is the clinical method-the procedure by which all doctors 
diagnose and heal the sick. Only the quacks pretend they have X-ray 
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eyes that can penetrate with one glance into the essence of the path-
ology of the body and mind. 
We suggest that in all instances the psychiatric expert be allowed 
to relate to the court exactly how he reached his opinion and what 
were the sources of his information. He should be required to 
describe in fairly precise terms his own process of evaluating his 
source material: what information did he accept, and what did he 
reject; what sources did he place great weight upon, and what 
sources did he minimize; and why did he evaluate the clinical ma-
terial in these ways. But always, the psychiatrist (as with all physi-
cians) must be trusted to determine in his own way what are the 
relevant clinical facts upon which a professional opinion can be 
based. For this, the psychiatrist is accountable to the standards of his 
professional colleagues and their accumulated body of professional 
skill and knowledge. He is also subject to cross-examination which 
may gain in incisiveness and pertinency proportionally to the free-
dom accorded him to tell the whole story. 
